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SECURITIES/ANTITRUST- Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange-The Securities Exchanges' System
of Fixed Commission Rates Is Impliedly Immune
from the Antitrust Laws.
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange' marks the Supreme Court's
most recent attempt to delineate the extent to which the securities
industry is subject to the antitrust laws., In April, 1971, Richard A.
Gordon filed suit on behalf of himself and a small class of similarly
situated investors against the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the American Exchange (AMEX), and two representative firms.
Gordon alleged that the exchanges' system of fixed commission
rates4 constituted price discrimination and price-fixing in violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act 5 and the Sherman Act. The district
court, in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment,7 re-
lied on section 19(b)(9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
1. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
2. See generally Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1970); Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities
Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the
Securities Field, 16 WEST. REs. L. REV. 131 (1964).
3. These two representative firms were Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and
Bache & Company, Inc.
4. The fixed commission rate system was effective for transactions of less than $500,000.
NYSE CONST. art. XV, § 2 (1971); AMEX CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1971). Additionally, there was
a surcharge of $15 on all transactions involving less than 1,000 shares, volume discounts on
trades over 1,000 shares, and negotiated rates for portions of orders in excess of $500,000.
NYSE Rule 383 (1971), repealed April 1, 1974; AMEX Rule 396 (1971), repealed April 1, 1974.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ...
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
7. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 498
F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974). Since plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the merits, the district
court did not consider his motion for a class action determination. Plaintiff's claim under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), was dismissed because the court did not find
the securities to be commodities within the meaning of the Act.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970), which provided:
The Commission is further authorized, if after making appropriate request in writ-
ing to a national securities exchange that such exchange effect on its own behalf
specified changes in its rules and practices, and after appropriate notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing, the Commission determines that such exchange has not made
the changes so requested, and that such changes are necessary or appropriate for
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which authorized the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to
supervise the exchanges in "fixing of reasonable rates of commis-
-sion."9 Finding the exchanges' price-fixing activity subject to SEC
review, the court held applicable the antitrust immunity first al-
luded to in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.0
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed," finding that imposi-
tion of the antitrust laws would unduly interfere with the operation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 Therefore, the Court rea-
soned that implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary to make
the Exchange Act work."' 3 In reaching this decision, the Supreme
Court willingly accepted two related propositions. First, the essence
of plaintiff's suit constittited an attack only on exchange rules, not
upon their application." These rules are subject to SEC review
under section 19(b)(9). 5 Second, pursuant to section 19(b)(9), the
SEC has actively and efficiently fulfilled its duty to supervise these
exchange rules.'" Therefore, the exchanges' price-fixing activity
must be accorded that antiturst immunity first recognized in Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange.7
This article attempts to establish the following: (1) it is specious
for a court to determine whether an antitrust suit attacks securities
the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such
exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange, by rules or regulations
or by order to alter or supplement the rules of such exchange (insofar as necessary
or appropriate to effect such changes) in respect of such matters as . . . (9) the
fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other charges.
9. Id.
10. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). In Silver, plaintiff commenced an antitrust action against the
NYSE when the Exchange, without affording a hearing or providing an explanation, ordered
its members to sever all direct wire and ticker service with plaintiff's two securities firms.
The Supreme Court refused to view the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et
seq. (1970), as a blanket antitrust exemption for the NYSE. Rather, the proper approach was
to reconcile the operation of the antitrust laws with the regulatory scheme. This reconciliation
was achieved through the principle that "[lrepeal is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary." 373 U.S. at 357. For detailed discussion of Silver, see text accompanying
notes 18 through 50 infra.
11. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
12. Id. at 691.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 661.
15. Id. at 685.
16. Id. at 682.
17. Id. at 685.
In Silver, the Court concluded that there was no implied repeal of the antitrust laws
because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970), did not provide
for SEC jurisdiction or review of particular rule applications tendered by the exchanges.
However, it was found that if the SEC had jurisdiction and if there was ensuing SEC review
of a particular exchange ruling, there would exist a "different case" concerning antitrust
exemption. 373 U.S. at 358n.12.
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exchange rules or merely their application; (2) contrary to the
Gordon Court's findings, the SEC has failed miserably in its at-
tempt to efficiently supervise the exchanges' system of fixed com-
mission rates; and (3) the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is both
applicable and necessary in antitrust challenges to conduct subject
to SEC review.
Silver: A "DIFFERENT CASE"
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange," the Supreme Court ini-
tially acknowledged potential antitrust immunity for the securities
industry. 9 Silver brought an antitrust action against the NYSE
which, in ex parte fashion, had ordered its members to sever all
direct wire and ticker service with his two securities firms.' The
NYSE claimed that its actions were immune from antitrust liability
under section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21 How-
ever, the Court, after reviewing the purposes, scope, and structure
of that Act,2" found no express exemption from either the antitrust
laws or any other statute. 3 Accordingly, any rebeal of the antitrust
laws must result by implication 2 and "[ilt is a cardinal principle
of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. ' 2 The
Court emphasized that repeal is to be implied only to the extent
necessary to effective implementation of the Securities Exchange
Act.26
The Silver Court noted that both the constitution and rules of the
NYSE provided that wire service between a member and a non-
member could be terminated at will.27 The NYSE constitution and
rules contained no provision for notice or a hearing prior to such
termination.2 8 Section 19(b) grants the SEC jurisdiction to disap-
prove the rules of the exchanges.29 The Court, in a hair-splitting
maneuver, concluded that Silver was attacking not the NYSE consi-
18. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
19. Id. at 360.
20. Id. at 344.
21. Id. at 346.
22. Id. at 349-57.
23. Id. at 357.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). See California v. Federal Power
Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57
(1945).
26. 373 U.S. at 357.
27. Id. at 344.
28. Id. at 361.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
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titution and rules, but their particular application to him.3 0 After
concocting the notion that the SEC could not disapprove or regulate
any particular application of the rules,31 the Court determined that
there was no governmental oversight of the self-regulatory scheme;32
no method of protecting the public interest in competition;3 3 and no
conflict of the regulatory scheme with the antitrust laws.3 1 Conse-
quently, this discontinuance of wire service subjected the NYSE to
application of the antitrust laws .3 In attempting to qualify its rec-
onciliation of the conflict between the antitrust laws and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the Silver Court created the caveat even-
tually embraced by the Gordon Court:
[sihould review of exchange self-regulation be provided through
a vehicle other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to anti-
trust exemption would be presented."
The Gordon Court resolved that it had found Silver's "different
case."37 Whereas Silver presented a case of SEC impotence to affect
particular applications of exchange rules, Gordon involved statutory
authorization for SEC review of all exchange rules dealing with the
commission rate structure.3 1 Careful analysis of these two cases re-
veals that the Court's distinction between rule and application of
rule is an exercise in tedium ad infinitum.
Contrary to the Court's finding, attack of a rule is implicit attack
of its application, as demonstrated by logical progression: attack of
a rule requires standing;39 standing requires that the litigant has
sustained damage;4" to have sustained damage, the litigant must
have been subjected to the rule's application. In Silver, the rules of
the NYSE allowed severance of the lines of communication to non-
member dealers.4 Since those rules established no regulatory proce-
30. 373 U.S. at 357.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 358.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 360.
36. Id.
37. 422 U.S. at 685.
38. Id.
39. Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407 (1860); United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S.
600 (1941); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40. Id.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover treble damages. . ..
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
41. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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dure for such severance, they implicitly allowed the ex parte action
which Silver subsequently challenged. 42 Therefore, Silver was at-
tacking the rule allowing severance as well as its application.
Gordon challenged the exchanges' rules requiring fixed commis-
sion rates. 3 Yet, in order to qualify for the damages sought, 4 Gordon
would necessarily have to demonstrate that he had suffered finan-
cial detriment as a result of the application of the challenged rules
to him. Thus, both Gordon and Silver assailed the particular appli-
cation of exchange rules, as well as the rules themselves.
The logical extension of Gordon's rule-application distinction is
to grant antitrust immunity in all cases where the SEC has actively
been supervising exchange activity. Assume, for example, that a
member of the NYSE is operating his place of business in violation
of either the NYSE constitution or its rules. The NYSE can penalize
the member and/or threaten revocation of his membership unless
his activity conforms to its rules. The member may then file suit in
federal district court, alleging that this application of the rules vio-
lates the antiturst laws. 5 Plaintiff-member will claim, pursuant to
Silver, that he challenges not the validity of the rules, but merely
their particular application to him.4" Defendant-NYSE can be ex-
pected to move for summary judgment, claiming: (1) plaintiff is
essentially attacking the rules and not their particular application
to him; (2) section 19(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
grantsthe SEC supervisory authority over these rules;17 and (3) the
SEC has been actively exercising that supervisory authority. Thus,
plaintiff's action is barred by Gordon's implied repeal of the anti-
trust laws. Should the court decide that plaintiff is challenging the
application of a rule, as in Silver, a denial of defendant's motion and
an adjudication on the merits is required. 9 Such an adjudication
42. See Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN.
L. REv. 675, 687 (1970).
43. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
44. Gordon brought a class action, the class comprised of himself and similarly situated
investors. In addition to seeking injunctive relief, he requested treble damages of $1.5 billion,
plus interest, attorneys' fees of $10 million, and other costs and disbursements. 422 U.S. at
661n.3.
45. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1970).
46. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
47. Section 19(b)(5) provided that the SEC had the power to "alter or supplement the
rules of such exchange . . . in respect of such matters as . . . (5) the manner, method and
place of soliciting business. ... 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(5) (1970). Under the 1975 Amendments
the SEC is granted the power to change the rules of a self-regulatory organization in any
respect, not just with respect to certain enumerated areas. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Aug. 1975
Pamph.).
48. 422 U.S. at 691.
49. 373 U.S. at 360.
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will necessarily approve, alter, or supplement the NYSE rules.
Tlhus, the court will be exercising a power which Gordon and Silver
found to be solely within the purview of the SEC."0 For this reason
an adjudication on the merits cannot be allowed; the motion for
summary judgment must be granted; any remedial action must
come from the SEC. The conclusion is obvious-the securities in-
dustry's activity is effectively exempt from the antitrust laws.
SEC ACTIVITY UNDER SECTION 19(b)(9)
Imposition of Government Regulation on the Securities Industry
The Buttonwood Tree Agreement, executed in 1792 by a number
of securities dealers and traders, marked the creation of the NYSE
and the establishment of fixed rates of commission.5' In 1913, the
House Committee on Banking and Currency conducted a general
investigation of the stock exchanges and reported that fixed rates
of commission were rigidly enforced in order to prevent competition
among members."2 However, no remedial action was taken because
the Committee believed the rates to be reasonable. The Committee
opined that low or competitive rates would encourage irresponsi-
bility of members, promote speculation, and destroy the value of
membership." Additionally, the securities exchanges were histori-
cally treated by courts as private clubs not subject to government
regulation. 4 It was not until the securities industry attained a prom-
50. 422 U.S. at 690; 373 U.S. at 363.
51. SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 295 (1963).
We the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock, do hereby
solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not buy or sell
from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public Stock at a less rate
than one-quarter percent Commission on the Specie value, and that we will give a
preference to each other in our Negotiations. In Testimony whereof we have set our
hands this 17th day of May, at New York, 1792.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 39 (1913) [hereinafter cited as Pujo Report].
Mr. Sturgis, a former president of the NYSE, testified that violation of the exchange rules
was regarded as one of the most infamous crimes that a member could commit. The violation
was considered a gross breach of faith, punishable by suspension from one to five years for
the first violation and expulsion for the second. The object of the rules and their severe
penalties was to prevent competition among members.
53. Id. at 115-16.
54. See Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888). A member of the NYSE
assigned his membership to plaintiff. The member was then expelled for insolvency and his
membership subsequently sold. Plaintiff filed suit for the proceeds of the sale. The court,
likening the NYSE to a business club, determined that a member does not have absolute title
to his membership. Upon a determination of insolvency the member could be expelled and
plaintiff would not be entitled to the proceeds of the sale. See also Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S.
523 (1876).
Shortly after the Sherman Act was enacted, the Supreme Court indicated doubt whether
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inent position in the nation's financial structure that the private
club analogy became inappropriate.55
The stock market crash of 1929 and the problems of 1933 spurred
the passage of the Securities Act of 193356 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 51 This regulatory legislation was designed to
securities were commodities and suggested that they might fall outside the commerce power
on which that Act was passed. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 597-98 (1898).
55. Doubts as to the validity of fixed commission rates should have occurred no later than
1927, when the Supreme Court determined that agreements constraining competitors to a
minimum common price were illegal per se. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.. 273 U.S.
392, 396-402 (1927). However, fixed commission rates faced no formal challenges at that time.
One writer has expressed the theory that any threats to these rates were greatly reduced by
the hostility toward competitive markets which characterized the first Roosevelt administra-
tion. President Roosevelt's early advisors were dedicated to an inverted Keynesianism which
asserted that if prices could be forced up, employment and production would return to higher
and more normal levels. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes
Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675, 677 (1970).
56. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§ I et seq., 48 Stat. 74, as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a
et seq. (1970).
In the decade following World War I, over 50 billion new securities were issued in the United
States. Approximately 50% of these securities were worthless. W.O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC
OF LIBERTY 221 (1954) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS].
The states were powerless to effectively regulate the industry, since they could not reach
out-of-state promoters. As a result, Congress, under pressure from President Roosevelt, en-
acted the Securities Act of 1933, requiring full disclosure of the financial and business under-
pinnings of companies issuing securities.
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§ 1 et seq., 48 Stat. 881, as amended 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq. (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
Speculation in securities, stock market pools, and other ways of manipulating security
prices were the forces behind the collapse of the market in 1929. From 1929 to 1932, the
market value of all stocks on the NYSE dropped from $89 billion to $15 billion. See DOUGLAS,
supra note 56, at 221.
As preventive medicine against a recurrence of the 1929 disaster, President Roosevelt
encouraged Congress to enact the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In a letter to Representa-
tive Rayburn, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
President Roosevelt stated his conviction that unregulated speculation in securities was one
of the most important factors contributing to the unwarranted "boom" following the crash
of 1929. President Roosevelt expressed his commitment to definite regulation of the ex-
changes. Two objectives to be sought were: (1) the requirement of margins designed to curtail
speculation; and (2) governmental supervisory power sufficient to correct any future abuses
which may arise. The primary goal was to be the prevention of price manipulation which
ultimately operates to the detriment of investors along with the elimination of destructive
speculation. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sam Rayburn, March 26, 1934, H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7702 (1934).
Samuel Untermyer, formerly chief counsel to the committee that drafted the Pujo Report,
supra note 52, testified that he was of the belief that the exchanges were essentially public
institutions and should be subject to close government regulation. Hearings on S. Res. 97
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7705 (1934).
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce determined:
The fundamental fact behind the necessity for this bill is that the leaders of
private business, whether because of inertia, pressure of vested interests, lack of
organization, or otherwise, have not since the war been able to act to protect
Fixed Commission Rates
promote responsible conduct throughout the securities industry. ' ,
However, government entry into the industry was not intended to
totally displace self-regulation. 59 The exchanges were still responsi-
ble for promulgating rules and regulations pertaining to their own
affairs. When the exchanges, in establishing rules and regulations,
failed to protect investors, the SEC was authorized under section
19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to compel them to do
SO.
60
The Issue of SEC Efficiency
The Gordon Court concluded that the SEC, from 1958 to 1975,
was actively and efficiently fulfilling its duty to supervise the ex-
changes in the fixing of reasonable rates of commission. " A careful
review of that period reveals otherwise. In 1958, the SEC announced
a study of NYSE commission rates to determine whether they were
"reasonable and in accordance with the standards contemplated by
applicable provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."I' The
SEC acknowledged that the study was undertaken pursuant to its
duties imposed by section 19(b).63 This study had three direct re-
themselves by compelling a continuous and orderly program of change in methods
and standards of doing business to match the degree to which the economic system
has itself been constantly changing ...
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7702 (1934).
58. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 502 (1963). The SEC carefully reviewed the three-fold need for government supervi-
sion of exchange self-regulation which motivated the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The first was to assure that the exchanges assume responsibility for self-
regulation. Second, since self-regulation involves some degree of impairment of competition,
governmental regulation is necessary to limit such impairment as much as possible. Third.
insofar as the exchanges operate as quasi-public institutions, public supervision is required
for much the same reason that public utilities are regulated.
59. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 501 (1963). The SEC briefly described the agency's historic regulation of the securi-
ties exchanges:
The Commission's relationship to the business it regulates is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of other Federal independent administrative agencies; it is not only
the regulator, but also supervisor of "self"-regulators .... [Slecurities regulation
is unique in featuring self-regulation as an essential and officially sanctioned part
of the regulatory pattern.
William 0. Douglas, while serving as Chairman of the SEC, described the "proper relation-
ship" between the stock exchanges and the SEC as:
. ..letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual
role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well
oiled, clean ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.
W.O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (J. Allen ed. 1968).
60. See note 8 supra for complete text of 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
61. 422 U.S. at 682.
62. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5678 (April 14, 1958).
63. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5889 (Feb. 20, 1959).
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sults: (1) the SEC was to be afforded greater advance notice of
proposed rate changes; (2) the SEC and NYSE were to collaborate
in further study of the rate structure; and (3) the NYSE agreed to
reduce commission rates in certain transactions. 4
The 1958 study was followed by a 1961 SEC investigation of the
adequacy of exchange rules for the protection of investors. Two
years and six volumes later, the SEC concluded that a further study
was necessary to determine and articulate the criteria important in
arriving at reasonable rate structures."5
The Court found the 1958 and 1961 studies significant in that the
SEC had initiated a thorough overhaul of the fixed commission rate
structure, an institutionalized tradition in the securities industry."
However, stripped of its accoutrements, the result of the 1958
study was a conclusion that a second study would be necessary; 7 the
result of the 1961 study was a conclusion that a third study would
be necessary.
Finally, after ten years of study, the SEC proposed alternative
price systems to the exchanges and urged their implementation. In
1968, the SEC requested that the NYSE reduce its rates on orders
for round lots in excess of 400 shares or, alternatively, eliminate
minimum rate requirements for orders in excess of $50,000.6 These
proposed modifications were considered interim measures, pending
further study.70 They were eventually adopted in a restricted form
when the NYSE and AMEX adopted a volume discount for orders
exceeding 1,000 shares." This minimal alteration was accorded SEC
approval." In 1971, the SEC concluded that minimum commissions
on institutional size orders were neither necessary nor appropriate,
and announced that it would not object to competitive rates on
orders above a designated level. 73 The SEC proceeded, over the next
three years, to phase out fixed commission rates.74 The death knell
64. Id.
65. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., ist Sess. (1963). The study was conducted pursuant to section 19(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (1970).
66. 422 U.S. at 668-69.
67. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
69. SEC Securities Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
70. Letter from SEC Chairman Cohen to NYSE President Haack, May 28, 1968, cited in
SEC Securities Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
71. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1968, at 3, col. 1; Oct. 11, 1968, at 3, col. 2; Oct. 25,
1968, at 2, col. 3; Nov. 26, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
72. Id.
73. SEC Securities Act Release No. 9007 (Oct. 22, 1970).
74. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973); SEC Securities Act Release
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tolled in January, 1975, when the SEC ordered that by May 1, 1975,
competitive rates be utilized by exchange members in all transac-
tions involving persons other than members.7" Use of a phase-out
program was justified by an SEC claim that hasty changes would
result in a sharp revenue decline for the industry.7"
The Gordon Court found that the SEC phase-out program bal-
anced the competing interests in the price-fixing dilemma by elimi-
nating the system of fixed commission rates in a manner designed
to retain financial stability for the exchanges.77 The Court also con-
cluded that the record provided ample evidence that the SEC ac-
tively fulfilled its responsibilities under section 19(b)(9).11 However,
this perception regarding the SEC's proficiency in policing the ex-
changes' price systems is a prismatic illusion.
Like Odysseus traversing the Aegean, the SEC embarked upon a
circuitous journey, finally achieving its destination only after 17
years of delay, occasioned by an incessant propensity to succumb
to the siren song of the exchanges. In 1968, the SEC requested the
exchanges to reduce their rates;79 however, upon encountering ex-
change resistance, the SEC acquiesced to a volume discount sub-
stantially less than its original proposal.'" Additionally, in 1970, the
NYSE determined that a service charge of the lesser of $15 or 50
percent of the required minimum commission on orders less than
1,000 shares should be imposed.' The SEC permitted this service
charge to become operative on a 90-day interim basis, pending fur-
ther rate structure hearings.2 In reality, these "interim" rates re-
mained operative for over 23 months. 3
In 1971, the SEC determined that minimum commissions were
No. 10206 (June 6, 1973); SEC Securities Act Release No. 10560 (Dec. 14, 1973); SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 11019 (Sept. 19, 1974).
75. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975). In order to permit an orderly
transition, competition in floor brokerage rates was deferred until May 1, 1976.
76. SEC Securities Act Release No. 10560 (Dec. 14, 1973). Facing criticism for allowing a
temporary increase in commission rates, SEC Chairman Garrett noted that the increase was
necessary due to the inflation in exchange costs and the decline in the volume of transactions.
The rate increase was justified as forestalling any industry impairment during the transition
to competitive rates.
77. 422 U.S. at 673-74.
78. Id. at 682.
79. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 71 and 72 supra.
81. NYSE Proposed Rule 383. Letter from NYSE President Haack to NYSE members,
March 19, 1970, cited in SEC Securities Act Release No. 8860 (April 2, 1970).
82. Letter from SEC Chairman Budge to NYSE President Haack, April 2, 1970, quoted
in SEC Securities Act Release No. 8860 (April 2, 1970); SEC Securities Act Release No. 8923
(July 2, 1970).
83. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 671 (1975).
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neither necessary nor appropriate. However, the Commission of-
fered no proposals for change, merely stating that it would not
object to competitive rates on portions of orders above a designated
level ." The SEC's original $100,000 breakpoint fell prey to the ex-
changes' demand for a $500,000 cut-off, above which competitive
rates would be allowed."'
The SEC, in 1972, released its Policy Study examining the prob-
lems of the securities markets, many of which were attributed to the
prevailing commission rate structure." Upon completion of this
study, competitive rates were gradually imposed upon the ex-
changes. 7 Nevertheless, this prolonged phase-out program experi-
enced further detours.
On January 16, 1973, the SEC announced that it was considering
reduction of the breakpoint on competitive rates to orders in excess
of $100,000.11 However, stimulated by a NYSE request to permit an
increase of 15 percent of current rates on all orders from $5,000 to
$300,000 and a minimum commission on orders below $5,000, the
SEC, in June of 1973, held additional hearings on the rate struc-
ture.89 Three months later, the SEC once again acceded to a rate
increase proposed by the NYSE. 0 Attached to this approval was a
cursory warning that if the exchanges did not terminate fixed com-
mission rates by May, 1975, the SEC would do so.'
On September 19, 1974, the SEC formally requested the ex-
changes to eliminate fixed commission rates by April 30, 1975.12
Confronted with negative exchange reactions, the SEC cowered
from this position and released the proposed changes for public
comment. 3 It was not until January 23, 1975, that the Commission
determined to adopt the rules eliminating fixed commission rates.9
84. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
85. SEC Securities Act Release No. 9007 (Oct. 22, 1970).
86. Statement of the SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg.
5286 (Feb. 2, 1972). The Policy Study noted that:
Our concern with the fixed minimum commission . . . is not only with the level of
the rate structure but with its side effects as well. Of these, perhaps the most
important are the following: (a) Dispersion of trading in listed securities; (b) Reci-
procal practices of various kinds; (c) Increasing pressure for exchange memberships
by institutions.
87. See note 74 supra.
88. SEC Securities Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
89. SEC Securities Act Release No. 10206 (June 6, 1973).
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 10383 (Sept. 11, 1973).
91. Id.
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11019 (Sept. 19, 1974).
93. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11073 (Oct. 24, 1974).
94. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975). The decision to impose compet-
itive rates was based on the SEC's conclusion that competition, rather than the fixed rates,
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Thus, competitive commission rates were not imposed on the securi-
ties industry until four years after the SEC resolved that fixed com-
mission rates were neither necessary nor appropriate, and 17 years
after the original study was initiated. The SEC record of perform-
ance from 1958 to 1975 demonstrates a distinct lack of diligence and
a fetish for studies.
Congressional Criticism
The SEC's inefficiency was recognized by Congress. In 1972, the
Senate Subcommittee on Securities found that the fixed commis-
sion rate system failed to produce equitable and economic rates!"
and created a distortion in favor of the institutionally oriented
firms. 6 The Subcommittee expressed dissatisfaction with the SEC
because the agency: (1) claimed that it never approved NYSE rate
changes in 1971, but merely failed to object to them;97 (2) procras-
tinated in arriving at its decisions concerning the commission rate
structure;9" and (3) lacked clarity and perpetuated uncertainty in
its statements concerning the status of fixed rates on transactions
exceeding $100,000. 91 The Subcommittee stressed that fixed rates
must be promptly eliminated. °00
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
shortly after the Senate report, concluded that competitive rates
were in the best public interest and should be implemented without
excessive delay. 0' The Committee prodded the SEC to hasten its
canter in ordering competitive rates for transactions of all sizes. 1112
Despite its legislative mandate, the SEC has remained wholly
inefficient in eliminating the exchanges' fixed commission rate sys-
tem. Yet, incredibly, the Gordon Court concluded that this SEC
would best serve the interests of investors and the industry. This notion was not based on a
desire to foster competition, but on the various deficiences in the fixed commission rate
system, some of which are set forth in text accompanying notes i12 through 114 infra.
95. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-60 (1972).
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id. at 58. This is in reference to the SEC position in Independent Investor Protective
League v. Securities Exchange Commission, (S.D.N.Y. No. 71-1924), dismissed without
opinion (2d Cir. 1971).
98. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1972).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 60.
101. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INSTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1972).
102. Id.
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supervisory activity was sufficient to provide antitrust immunity to
the exchanges' price-fixing structure. In light of this conclusion, the
securities exchanges are effectively exempt from all antitrust juris-
diction.
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION UNDER THE SEC
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in response to a strong
public sentiment against trusts.0 3 While the primary goals of the
Act have long been a subject of confusion, 4 it is undisputed that
its major purpose is to check anticompetitive practices in the busi-
ness community." 5
The Sherman Act has attained near-constitutional dimensions. ""
The judiciary does not favor implied repeal of the antitrust laws by
regulatory statutes. 7 Any repeal must be based on a clear repug-
nancy between antitrust and the regulatory scheme. 0 The courts
remain leery of the regulatory agencies' ability or. commitment to
adequately promote competition among members of the regulated
industries. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the role of
the SEC is to decide whether certain exchange activities are in the
best interests of the investors and the exchanges."'9 As a result, the
SEC has developed an expertise in most phases of the securities
industry. But this is not to say that the SEC exhibits any predilec-
103. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U.CHI. L. REV.
221 (1956).
104. These goals range from the achievment and maintenance of competitive processes
in the economy to the prevention of the undue growth of big business. See Kestenbaum,
Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Allocation
of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812 (1967); Bork and Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 363 (1965); Blake and Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965).
105. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, at 689 (1975).
106. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933):
The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of inter-
state commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, to
afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic en-
deavor. As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability compara-
ble to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.
107. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
108. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 198-99 (1939).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970) predicated the authority of the SEC to request or compel
changes by the securities industry on a determination that:
such changes are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure
fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure fair administra-
tion of such exchange . . ...
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tion to promote competition as required by the Sherman Act.
This is demonstrated by an examination of the reasoning underly-
ing the SEC's order directing the elimination of the fixed commis-
sion rate system."' The transition to competitive pricing was based
on an SEC determination that competition in commission rates is
in the best interests of the securities exchanges and the industry as
a whole."' The SEC recognized numerous deficiencies in the fixed
commission rate structure: the structure tends to create conflicts of
interest on the part of institutional investors;" 2 the structure tends
to corrupt fiduciary relationships in these institutional investing
situations; the structure leads to inefficiency in the management of
assets;" 3 the structure, by its rigidity and dalliance, inhibits innova-
tions in the rendering of brokerage services to the investing public."'
The SEC never proffered the protection of competition as a reason
for its order and never addressed itself to the goals and policies of
the antitrust laws. Indeed, the SEC acknowledged that the fixed
rate system was not inherently evil in all situations, and refused to
commit itself to permanent abolition of the fixed commission rate
structure." 5 It is unreasonable to conclude that the SEC, in the
performance of its regulatory duties, has the propensity or expertise
to adequately enforce and promote antitrust policies as mandated
by the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the recent passage of the Securi-
ties Acts Amendments of 1975116 increases the responsibility of the
SEC in regulating the securities exchanges.
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
On June 5, 1975, President Ford signed a bill which enacted the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975."1 This legislation amends sec-
tion 19(b) of the 1934 Act by providing for mandatory SEC review
of all proposed rules offered by the exchanges."5 The exchanges
must file copies of any proposed rule with the SEC and justify that
proposal through a statement of basis and purpose." ' The SEC is
required to publish notice of the proposal so that interested persons
110. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975).
111. Id.
112. These institutional investors predominently engage in managing investments on be-
half of others, rather than investing their own funds.
113. Inefficiency in the management of assets results even when no misconduct is present.
114. SEC Securities Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975).
115. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq. (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
117. U.S. CODE CONG. AD. & NEws 613 (1975).
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
119. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(1) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
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may be provided an opportunity to submit relevant data, views and
arguments. 2" Unlike prior practice, where the SEC merely stated
that it had no objection to a proposed rule change, an explicit ap-
proval is now imperative. 2' Under the Amendments, the SEC has
35 days from the publication of notice in which to give its ap-
proval.'22 The SEC may approve the proposal upon a finding that it
is consistent with the requirements of the 1934 Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder. 2 3
The prior scheme under section 19(b) authorized the SEC to alter
or supplement the rules of the exchanges regarding twelve specifi-
cally enumerated categories. 2 ' Congress, by the Amendments, has
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
The SEC may, alternatively, order proceedings to determine whether the exchange's pro-
posal should be disapproved. The Amendments require notice of the grounds upon which
disapproval is being considered, and opportunity for hearing. These proceedings must be
concluded within 180 days, unless extended for up to 60 days for good cause. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(b)(2)(B) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
123. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
A proposal offered by an exchange may become effective summarily if the SEC determines
that it is necessary for the protection of investors, the maintenance of orderly markets, or the
safeguarding of securities or funds. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.). However,
the aforementioned filing procedure must thereafter be followed. Additionally, proposals on
specified matters may take effect upon filing with the SEC. Such specified matters include
those:
(i) constituting a stated policy, practice, or interpretation with respect to the
meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule of the self-regulatory
organization, (ii) establishing or changing a due, fee, or other charge imposed by
the self-regulatory organization, or (iii) concerned solely with the administration of
the self-regulatory organization or other matters which the Commission may, by
rule, consistent with the public interest and the purposes of this subsection, may
specify. ...
15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
Enforcement of the proposal may begin if it is not inconsistent with the Securities Ex-
change Act, or the rules and regulations thereunder. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (Aug. 1975
Pamph.). The SEC has the authority to specify other areas, concerning self-regulatory organi-
zation, in which the exchanges may enact rules upon filing with the SEC. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(b)(3)(A) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
124. Specifically, these areas were:
(1) safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility of members and adequate
provision against the evasion of financial responsibility through the use of corporate
forms or special partnerships; (2) the limitation or prohibition of the registration
or trading in any security within a specified period after the issuance or primary
distribution thereof; (3) the listing or striking from listing of any security;
(4) hours of trading; (5) the manner, method, and place of soliciting business;
(6) fictitious or numbered accounts; (7) the time and method of making settle-
ments, payments, and deliveries and of closing accounts; (8) the reporting of
transactions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the consent
of the exchange, including the method of reporting short sales, stopped sales, sales
of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales involving
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eliminated these twelve categories of express SEC jurisdiction.
While the legislation puts congressional pressure on the SEC to act
expeditiously, it substantially broadens'2 ' the agency's regulatory
authority. This creates an intriguing anomaly: whereas the recent
SEC experience with the exchanges' price-fixing system amply
demonstrates that the agency has been wholly inefficient in elimi-
nating fixed rates of commission, the Amendments have saddled the
SEC with even more responsibility in the self-regulatory scheme.
Furthermore, the Gordon Court, by granting the SEC exclusive ju-
risdiction, has thrust virtually all antitrust responsibility on this
agency which has demonstrated its inability to promote competition
among the exchanges.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
The Gordon Court failed to address the well established doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine is of judicial origin and is
"designed to avoid duplication and conflict between governmental
entities dealing with the same subject matter.""'2 As defined in
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 2 7 primary jurisdic-
tion:
• ..is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regula-
tory duties. . . . "Primary jurisdiction" . . . [is applied] where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views.' 2
This doctrine was first formulated in Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,'2" where a shipper filed suit against a
railroad for charging unreasonable rates. The Court held that the
plaintiff must initially seek relief from the Interstate Commerce
other special circumstances; (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, inter-
est, listing, and other charges; (10) minimum units of trading; (11) odd-lot pur-
chases and sales; (12) minimum deposits on margin accounts ...
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). Additionally, a thirteenth category provided for SEC supervision
of "similar matters." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(13) (1970).
125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(c) (Aug. 1975 Pamph.).
126. Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction: What It Is and What It Is Not, 13 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SEC. REP. 26 (1958).
127. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
128. Id. at 63-64.
129. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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Commission (ICC) which solely is vested with the power to origi-
nally entertain such actions.13 The Abilene decision was innovative
in realizing the potential for severing an issue from a case and di-
recting that issue to a governmental agency, expert in regulating the
particular industry. Nevertheless, the case bred confusion concern-
ing the utilization of the doctrines of primary and exclusive jurisdic-
tion. Abilene involved only one issue; that single issue was deferred
to the ICC. As a result, deferral to the agency on that issue was
indistinguishable from a dismissal of the case, the mandatory result
under exclusive jurisdiction.13' The confusion between the applica-
tion of these two doctrines was increased by three subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions.
In Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,132 a shipper of commodities
brought an antitrust action, alleging a combination and conspiracy
among certain carriers to set uniform rates for the transportation of
freight. The fixed rates had been filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, challenged before the Commission, and upheld as rea-
sonable. The Court determined that the exclusive remedy for exces-
sive rates had been vested by Congress in the ICC and, therefore,
dismissed the suit.' 33
In United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co. Ltd.,'34
a steamship company brought suit in equity under the antitrust
laws to enjoin a conference of steamship companies from contract-
ing to force the plaintiff out of business. Although the contracts had
not been submitted to the United States Shipping Board for ap-
proval, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the complaint, concluding that the Shipping Act "covers the domi-
nant facts alleged in the present case as constituting a violation of
the Antitrust Act."' '35 The Cunard Court held that the remedies
under the antitrust laws had been superseded by the relief
obtainable from the United States Shipping Board. In dismissing
130. Id. at 448.
131. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 421
(1965).
132. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
133. Id. at 162.
134. 284 U.S. 474 (1932). Plaintiff alleged an agreement among the defendants to grant
lower rates by as much as 100 percent to shippers who used the conference carriers exclu-
sively. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants granted rebates, circulated false rumors and
threatened to blacklist those brokers who dealt with him. Id. at 479.
135. Id. at 483.
The district court based its dismissal on the ground that the matters complained of were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Shipping Board under the Shipping Act
of 1916. United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 39 F.2d 204, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1929).
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the suit, the Court specifically noted the superior competence and
experience of that administrative body.'13
The government's allegations in Far East Conference v. United
States1:17 were almost identical to those of plaintiff in Cunard. The
Justice Department charged that a shipping conference had agreed
on a contract rate system in violation of the antitrust laws. While
the general conference agreement had been filed with the Federal
Maritime Board,13 the conference had failed to file its contract rate
tariffs. Failure to file rate tariffs was in direct contravention of 46
U.S.C. § 814 (1970), which provided that an unfiled agreement was
a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The Court held that the
government could not sue under the Sherman Act without first
seeking relief from the Federal Maritime Board. 39 However, unlike
the Keogh result, the Court did not hold that the plaintiff had no
cause of action. If the Federal Maritime Board were to refuse to
immunize the conference agreement, presumably the government
could seek an injunction or criminal sanctions under the antitrust
laws. 4
While A bilene, Keogh, Cunard, and Far East have received noto-
riety as classic primary jurisdiction cases, this quartet actually sang
the tune of exclusive jurisdiction.'
In such cases, a previously existing court remedy has been su-
perseded by an exclusive administrative remedy. For example, an
action in court by a shipper to recover unreasonable rates may be
held to be barred by a statute providing an agency proceeding for
reparations. This is not really primary jurisdiction; it is superses-
sion, or exclusive agency jurisdiction, since subsequent resort to
the courts as to the issue committed to the agency jurisdiction is
barred."'
136. 284 U.S. at 481-82.
137. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
138. Section 3 of the Shipping Act of 1916 created the United States Shipping Board.
Shipping Act of 1916. ch. 451. § 1, 39 Stat. 728. Through several steps the Board's functions
have come to its present successor, the Federal Maritime Board. In 1936, Congress created
the United States Maritime Commission. Act of June 29, 1936, ch. 858, § 201, 49 Stat. 1985.
In 1950 the present Federal Maritime Board was established. Reorganization Plan No. 21 of
1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3178-80 (1950).
139. 342 U.S. at 576.
140. Id. at 577.
141. Unfortunately, two of the most prominent administrative law authorities, Professors
Kenneth Culp Davis and Louis Jaffe, persist in adhering to the confusing proposition that
primary and exclusive jurisdiction are indistinguishable. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 19.01 (Supp. 1963); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 H.Av. L. REV. 1037 (1964).
142. McGovern, Types of Questions Over Which Administrative Agencies Do Not Have
Primary Jurisdiction, 1958 ANTITRUST REP. 57, 61-62 (1958).
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A truly classic primary jurisdiction case came before the Supreme
Court in 1973. In Ricci v. Chicago Merchantile Exchange,' plaintiff
charged the Chicago Merchantile Exchange with conspiracy to re-
strain trade, alleging that his membership in the exchange was
transferred in violation of the exchange rules, the Commodity Ex-
change Act, "4 and the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that
the antitrust action must be stayed until the Commodity Exchange
Commission determined the validity of the exchange's conduct
under the Commodity Exchange Act.'45 The Court maintained:
We make no claim that the Commission has authority to decide
either the question of immunity as such or that any rule of the
[Commodity] Exchange takes precedence over antitrust policies.
Rather, we simply recognize that Congress has established a
specialized agency that would determine either that a membership
rule of the Exchange has been violated or that it has been followed.
Either judgment would require determination of facts and the in-
terpretation and application of the Act and Exchange rules. And
either determination will be of great help to the antitrust court in
arriving at the essential accommodation between the antitrust and
the regulatory regimes. .... "I
The Court concluded that the Commission's resolution of the dis-
pute would allow "a more intelligent and sensitive judgment as to
whether the antitrust laws will punish what an apparently valid rule
of the Exchange permits."'' 7
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is invoked only in those cases
in which referral to an agency is necessary and helpful to a court in
resolving an antitrust suit.'48 Specifically, the doctrine is utilized
when the court determines that either of two situations exists:
(1) the question to be decided falls within the special expertise of
the administrative agency because of the agency's familiarity with
the industry; or (2) the question to be decided has been delegated
to the agency as an essential part of a pervasive regulatory scheme
that requires consistent administration." 9
These two related factors were both present in Gordon. The Court
found that the SEC had the requisite expertise to determine the
143. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
144. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
145. 409 U.S. at 302.
146. Id. at 307.
147. Id. at 308.
148. The costs, in terms of time and resources, inherent in the invocation of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction are sufficient deterrence against unnecessary deferral.
149. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 302 (1973).
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necessity of the fixed commission rate structure. 5 0 Additionally, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both prior and subsequent to the
1975 Amendments, delegated to the SEC supervisory authority over
exchange commission rates.'"' Therefore, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was definitely available for invocation by the Gordon
Court.
While the Gordon Court opted for exclusive jurisdiction, it is
obvious that the utilization of primary jurisdiction was necessary for
a proper consideration of the fixed commission rate system. The
SEC had, for 17 years, studied and analyzed the need for and the
propriety of the price-fixing structure.'52 However, the courts have
traditionally shown great deference to the antitrust laws.',3 Thus,
competing interests were presented in Gordon: the Sherman Act's
interest in checking anti-competitive practices in the business com-
munity versus the interest of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
in promoting fair and orderly markets within the securities industry.
In view of these competing interests, the Supreme Court necessarily
should have invoked primary jurisdiction and ordered the SEC to
determine if, for the protection of investors and the securities indus-
try, the fixed commission rate structure was essential. The Court
could have used that determination to decide whether the fixed
commission rate structure was violative of the antitrust laws or
necessary for the protection of the investing public and, therefore,
impliedly immune from the antitrust laws. To this extent, the utili-
zation of primary jurisdiction would have proved invaluable to the
Gordon Court's decision.'54 To the extent that it may contribute to
a proper reconciliation of the Sherman Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the doctrine proves a viable alternative to the
harshness of the holding in Gordon.
CONCLUSION
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange the Supreme Court held
that an application of the antitrust laws to the NYSE's fixed com-
mission rate structure is repugnant to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The Court found an abundant presence of SEC regulatory
activity and determined that Gordon was Silver's "different case"
150. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 124 and 125 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 62 through 76 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 106 and 107 supra.
154. For an enlightening discussion of primary jurisdiction, see Travis, Primary Jurisdic-
tion: A General Theory and Its Application to the Securities Exchange Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
926 (1975).
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where review of exchange self-regulation is provided by a vehicle
other than the antitrust laws. In view of the SEC's inability to
satisfactorily enforce the antitrust policies as required by the Sher-
man Act, and the indistinquishability of Silver, the antitrust laws
have been rendered dormant. Primary jurisdiction, a doctrine fos-
tered and effectively utilized by the Court in other regulatory
schemes, represents an alternative means of reconciling the inter-
play of the Sherman Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
STUART L. WHr
